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Sublime, Issue 17, 2009, pp. 90-93.)
Here is an idea that just might save the world. It is that science, properly understood,
provides us with the methodological key to the salvation of humanity.
A version of this idea can be found buried in the works of Karl Popper. Famously,
Popper argued that science cannot verify theories, but can only refute them. This sounds
very negative, but actually it is not, for science succeeds in making such astonishing
progress by subjecting its theories to sustained, ferocious attempted falsification. Every
time a scientific theory is refuted by experiment or observation, scientists are forced to
try to think up something better, and it is this, according to Popper, which drives science
forward.
Popper went on to generalize this falsificationist conception of scientific method to
form a notion of rationality, critical rationalism, applicable to all aspects of human life.
Falsification becomes the more general idea of criticism. Just as scientists make progress
by subjecting their theories to sustained attempted empirical falsification, so too all of us,
whatever we may be doing, can best hope to achieve progress by subjecting relevant
ideas to sustained, severe criticism. By subjecting our attempts at solving our problems
to criticism, we give ourselves the best hope of discovering (when relevant) that our
attempted solutions are inadequate or fail, and we are thus compelled to try to think up
something better. By means of judicious use of criticism, in personal, social and political
life, we may be able to achieve, in life, progressive success somewhat like the
progressive success achieved by science. We can, in this way, in short, learn from
scientific progress how to make personal and social progress in life. Science, as I have
said, provides the methodological key to our salvation.
I discovered Karl Popper’s work when I was a graduate student doing philosophy at
Manchester University, in the early 1960s. As an undergraduate, I was appalled at the
triviality, the sterility, of so-called “Oxford philosophy”. This turned its back on all the
immense and agonizing problems of the real world – the mysteries and grandeur of the
universe, the wonder of our life on earth, the dreadful toll of human suffering – and
instead busied itself with the trite activity of analysing the meaning of words. Then I
discovered Popper, and breathed a sigh of relief. Here was a philosopher who, with
exemplary intellectual integrity and passion, concerned himself with the profound
problems of human existence, and had extraordinarily original and fruitful things to say
about them. The problems that had tormented me had in essence, I felt, already been
solved.
But then it dawned on me that Popper had failed to solve his fundamental problem – the
problem of understanding how science makes progress. In one respect, Popper’s
conception of science is highly unorthodox: all scientific knowledge is conjectural;
theories are falsified but cannot be verified. But in other respects, Popper’s conception of
science is highly orthodox. For Popper, as for most scientists and philosophers, the basic
aim of science is knowledge of truth, the basic method being to assess theories with
respect to evidence, nothing being accepted as a part of scientific knowledge2
independently of evidence. This orthodox view – which I came to call standard
empiricism – is, I realised, false. Physicists only ever accept theories that are unified –
theories that depict the same laws applying to the range of phenomena to which the
theory applies. Endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals can always
be concocted, but these are always ignored. This means, I realised, that science does
make a big, permanent, and highly problematic assumption about the nature of the
universe independently of empirical considerations and even, in a sense, in violation of
empirical considerations – namely, that the universe is such that all grossly disunified
theories are false. Without some such presupposition as this, the whole empirical method
of science breaks down.
It occurred to me that Popper, along with most scientists and philosophers, had
misidentified the basic aim of science. This is not truth per se. It is rather truth
presupposed to be unified, presupposed to be explanatory or comprehensible (unified
theories being explanatory). Inherent in the aim of science there is the metaphysical –
that is, untestable – assumption that there is some kind of underlying unity in nature. The
universe is, in some way, physically comprehensible.
But this assumption is profoundly problematic. We do not know that the universe is
comprehensible. This is a conjecture. Even if it is comprehensible, almost certainly it is
not comprehensible in the way science presupposes it is today. For good Popperian
reasons, this metaphysical assumption must be made explicit within science and
subjected to sustained criticism, as an integral part of science, in an attempt to improve it.
The outcome is a new conception of science, and a new kind of science, which I called
aim-oriented empiricism. This subjects the aims, and associated methods, of science to
sustained critical scrutiny, the aims and methods of science evolving with evolving
knowledge. Philosophy of science (the study of the aims and methods of science)
becomes an integral, vital part of science itself. And science becomes much more like
natural philosophy in the time of Newton, a synthesis of science, methodology,
epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy.
The aim of seeking explanatory truth is however a special case of a more general aim,
that of seeking valuable truth. And this is sought in order that it be used by people to
enrich their lives. In other words, in addition to metaphysical assumptions inherent in the
aims of science there are value assumptions, and political assumptions, assumptions
about how science should be used in life. These are, if anything, even more problematic
than metaphysical assumptions. Here, too, assumptions need to be made explicit and
critically assessed, as an integral part of science, in an attempt to improve them.
Released from the crippling constraints of standard empiricism, science would burst out
into a wonderful new life, realising its full potential, responding fully both to our sense of
wonder and to human suffering, becoming both more rigorous and of greater human
value.
And then, in a flash of inspiration, I had my great idea. I could tread a path parallel to
Popper’s. Just as Popper had generalized falsificationism to form critical rationalism, so
I could generalise my aim-oriented empiricist conception of scientific method to form an
aim-oriented conception of rationality, potentially fruitfully applicable to all that we do,
to all spheres of human life. But the great difference would be this. I would be starting
out from a conception of science – of scientific method – that enormously improves on3
Popper’s notion. In generalizing this, to form a general idea of progress-achieving
rationality, I would be creating an idea of immense power and fruitfulness.
I knew already that the line of argument developed by Popper, from falsificationism to
critical rationalism, was of profound importance for our whole culture and social order,
and had far-reaching implications and application for science, art and art criticism,
literature, music, academic inquiry quite generally, politics, law, morality, economics,
psychoanalytic theory, evolution, education, history – for almost all aspects of human life
and culture. The analogous line of argument I was developing, from aim-oriented
empiricism to aim-oriented rationalism, would have even more fruitful implications and
applications for all these fields, starting as it did from a much improved initial conception
of the progress-achieving methods of science.
The key point is extremely simple. It is not just in science that aims are profoundly
problematic. This is true in life as well. Above all, it is true of the aim of creating a good
world – an aim inherently problematic for all sorts of more or less obvious reasons. It is
not just in science that problematic aims are misconstrued or “repressed”; this happens all
too often in life too, both at the level of individuals, and at the institutional or social level
as well. We urgently need to build into our scientific institutions and activities the aims-
and-methods-improving methods of aim-oriented empiricism, so that scientific aims and
methods improve as our scientific knowledge and understanding improve. Likewise, and
even more urgently, we need to build into all our other institutions, into the fabric of our
personal and social lives, the aims-and-methods-improving methods of aim-oriented
rationality, so that we may improve our personal, social and global aims and methods as
we live.
One outcome of the 20
th century is a widespread and deep-seated cynicism concerning
the capacity of humanity to make real progress towards a genuinely civilized, good
world. Utopian ideals and programmes, whether of the far left or right, that have
promised heaven on earth, have led to horrors. Stalin’s and Hitler’s grandiose plans led
to the murder of millions. Even saner, more modest, more humane and rational political
programmes, based on democratic socialism, liberalism, or free markets and capitalism,
seem to have failed us. Thanks largely to modern science and technology, many of us
today enjoy far richer, healthier and longer lives than our grandparents or great
grandparents, or those who came before. Nevertheless the modern world is confronted
by grave global problems: the lethal character of modern war, the spread and threat of
armaments, conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear, rapid population growth,
severe poverty of millions in Africa, Asia and elsewhere, destruction of tropical rain
forests and other natural habitats, rapid extinction of species, annihilation of languages
and cultures. And over everything hangs the menace of climate change, threatening to
intensify all the other problems (apart, perhaps, from population growth).
All these grave global problems are the almost inevitable outcome of the successful
exploitation of science and technology plus the failure to build aim-oriented rationality
into the fabric of our personal, social and institutional lives. Modern science and
technology make modern industry and agriculture possible, which in turn make possible
population growth, modern armaments and war, destruction of natural habitats and
extinction of species, and global warming. Modern science and technology, in other
words, make it possible for us to achieve the goals of more people, more industry and
agriculture, more wealth, longer lives, more development, housing and roads, more4
travel, more cars and aeroplanes, more energy production and use, more and more lethal
armaments (for defence only of course!). These things seem inherently desirable and, in
many ways, are highly desirable. But our successes in achieving these ends also bring
about global warming, war, vast inequalities across the globe, destruction of habitats and
extinction of species. All our current global problems are the almost inevitable outcome
of our long-term failure to put aim-oriented rationality into practice in life, so that we
actively seek to discover problems associated with our long-term aims, actively explore
ways in which problematic aims can be modified in less problematic directions, and at
the same time develop the social, the political, economic and industrial muscle able to
change what we do, how we live, so that our aims become less problematic, less
destructive in both the short and long term. We have failed even to appreciate the
fundamental need to improve aims and methods as the decades go by. Conventional
ideas about rationality are all about means, not about ends, and are not designed to help
us improve our ends as we proceed. Implementing aim-oriented rationality is essential if
we are to survive in the long term. To repeat, the idea spelled out in this book, if taken
seriously, just might save the world.
Einstein put his finger on what is wrong when he said "Perfection of means and
confusion of goals seems, to my opinion, to characterize our age." This outcome is
inevitable if we restrict rationality to means, and fail to demand that rationality – the
authentic article – must quite essentially include the sustained critical scrutiny of ends.
Scientists, and academics more generally, have a heavy burden of responsibility for
allowing our present impending state of crisis to develop. Putting aim-oriented
rationality into practice in life can be painful, difficult and counter-intuitive. It involves
calling into question some of our most cherished aspirations and ideals. We have to learn
how to live in aim-oriented rationalistic ways. And here, academic inquiry ought to have
taken a lead. The primary task of our schools and universities, indeed, ought to have
been, over the decades, to help us learn how to improve aims and methods as we live.
Not only has academia failed miserably to take up this task, or even see it as necessary or
desirable. Even worse, perhaps, academia has failed itself to put aim-oriented rationality
into practice. Science has met with such astonishing success because it has put
something like aim-oriented empiricism into scientific practice – but this has been
obscured and obstructed by the conviction of scientists that science ought to proceed in
accordance with standard empiricism – with its fixed aim and fixed methods. Science
has achieved success despite, and not because of, general allegiance of scientists to
standard empiricism.
The pursuit of scientific knowledge dissociated from a more fundamental concern to
help humanity improve aims and methods in life is, as we have seen, a recipe for disaster.
This is the crisis behind all the others. We are in deep trouble. We can no longer afford
to blunder blindly on our way. We must strive to peer into the future and steer a course
less doomed to disaster. Humanity must learn to take intelligent and humane
responsibility for the unfolding of history.